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Abstract
Solar Radiation Management (SRM) is a set of potential technologies to counteract
climate change. Liability regimes are one potential form of governance institution to
avoid global externalities caused by the SRM ”free-driver” problem. In this paper I
examine the incentives structure and welfare consequences of SRM liability regimes.
Characteristics specific to SRM impact on the incentives that liability regimes pro-
vide via the definition of harm and the liability standard. Consequently, a liability
regime is defined as a combination of a definition of harm and a liability standard
in the model. Providing several interpretations of these two dimensions adequate
for the SRM context, I show that only one combination implements the social opti-
mum. A numerical implementation of the model yields that the free-driver problem
is moderate given a metric of mean temperature and extreme given a metric of mean
precipitation. Furthermore, the implementation suggests that liability regimes are
generally capable of mitigating the free-driver problem substantially and that the
choice of the definition of harm is more consequential than the choice of the liability
standard.
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1 Introduction
Due to slow progress of climate change mitigation, techniques to increase the reflection
of incoming solar radiation in the atmosphere, so-called Solar Radiation Management
(SRM), have received increasing attention as potential means to reduce climate change
risks. SRM is a potential high-leverage set of technologies which could be capable of
lowering global temperatures within short time-scales (Keith et al. 2010). Under plau-
sible assumptions, SRM seems to be cheap enough to be undertaken by a single country
and with very small direct costs, compared to mitigation or unmitigated climate change
damages (Barrett 2008, Keith et al. 2010). Since SRM also would have regionally dif-
ferent impacts (Lunt et al. 2008, Robock et al. 2008, Irvine et al. 2010, Ricke et al.
2010), it constitutes a ”free-driver” problem (Weitzman 2015): Without any form of
governance in place, the country with the strongest preferences for SRM has incentives
to deploy SRM beyond the preferred provision point of all other countries. This free-
driver outcome is highly undesirable from a social point of view and calls for some form
of governance.
An emphasis on the need for governance for Geoengineering in general, and SRM
in particular, is ubiquitous in the literature (Barrett 2008, Shepherd 2009, Keith et al.
2010, Rayner et al. 2013, Pasztor 2017). Liability regimes as potential tools for SRM
governance have gained wide attention, with a focus on historical precedents, the applica-
bility of existing international law to SRM, political feasibility and the issue of causation
(Horton et al. 2014, Saxler et. al 2015, Reynolds 2015). From an economic point of
view, the purpose of liability regimes is to solve incentive problems and liability regimes
are a widely used and researched tool for internalizing environmental externalities.1 In
this paper I develop a theoretical model of SRM liability which I then numerically im-
plement, in order to understand the basic incentive structure and to examine the extent
to which different liability regimes can solve the free-driver incentive problem.
SRM has a key feature which sets it apart from more traditional domains of liability
like car accidents or pollution problems. Following Weitzman’s terminology, SRM is a
public good-or-bad, a public good which benefits agents at some levels and harms the
same agents at other levels: Studies focusing on two of the most important climate
1Prominent national, supranational and international examples include the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act in the US, the European Environmental Liability
Directive 2004/35/EC, the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage and the
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects.
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metrics, mean temperature and mean precipitation, suggest that moderate amounts of
SRM would benefit most regions of the world (Moreno-Cruz et al. 2012, Kravitz et
al. 2014, Yu et al. 2015) and that SRM would only start to be detrimental to those
regions’ welfare if provided beyond those moderate amounts.2 The public good-or-bad
characteristic impacts on the incentives a liability regime provides in two ways. The first
one is via the definition of harm, i.e. the question of which SRM impacts have to be
compensated for. The second one is via the liability standards, i.e. the question of the
circumstances under which harm from SRM has to be compensated for.
In this paper I focus on the implications of SRM’s public good-or-bad characteristic
for liability regimes. Consequently, a liability regime in the model consists of a definition
of harm and a liability standard. There are n agents in the model, who can be thought
of as countries or regions, having climate preferences in the form of convex damage
functions. In order to reflect the good-or-bad characteristic, at least some agents benefit
from moderate SRM levels. The agent with the strongest preferences for SRM is assumed
to be the sole SRM provider. Direct costs are assumed to be negligible. I examine the
equilibrium outcome both under no liability (the free-driver outcome) and under various
liability regimes, each consisting of a definition of harm and a liability standard, relative
to the social optimum defined by the minimization of aggregate damages.
The reference point against which harm is measured or should be measured is not
self-evident for a public good-or-bad. One possibility is to use the victim’s position in a
world without any SRM as reference point. I call this the absolute definition of harm.
A second possibility is to use the victim’s preferred provision level as reference point,
a world in which SRM is not provided beyond the victim’s optimum. I call this the
marginal definition of harm. In contrast, the two definitions of harm coincide for a pure
bad like car accidents or pollution, since a victim’s optimal provision level is then always
zero.
Negligence, one of two fundamental types of liability standards, uses a behavioral
standard in order to determine whether to assign liability. The traditional economic
interpretation of the negligence standard is that it balances the marginal costs with the
marginal benefits of avoiding harm (Posner 1972, Landes and Posner 1987): The injurer
can forgo a reduction of own damages (and potentially those of some third parties) in
2Mean temperature and mean precipitation are of great relevance for impacts which could trigger a
lawsuit: directly, since they, for example, greatly influence which types of agriculture are feasible in a
given region and indirectly, since they are closely connected to the probability of occurrence of extreme
events.
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order to not increase damages of other agents. In a one-victim-one-injurer setting, there
is only one way to trade off marginal costs and benefits from avoiding harm. However, the
public good-or-bad SRM constitutes a multiple-victim-third-party-beneficiary setting,
raising the question of whose costs and whose benefits are or should be traded off by a
negligence standard. I will give three interpretations of the negligence standard.
From a normative welfare perspective all agents’ welfare should be considered in the
negligence standard. I call the standard emerging from considering all agents benefits
and harms the benefit-harm negligence standard. However, consideration of effects on
parties that are not part of the trial is generally not permissible in international law,
probably the most important body of law for SRM, rendering the benefit-harm negligence
standard unlikely to be applied in practice. The other two interpretations are designed
to reflect potential scenarios of a trial and third-party beneficiaries are consequently
excluded from the standard in these interpretations. The first scenario is a trial between
all victims and the injurer. Here, the victims’ harm is considered on aggregate, giving rise
to the aggregate harm negligence standard. In the second scenario, there are individual
trials between each victim and the injurer. Here, each victim’s harm is considered
individually, giving rise to the individual harm negligence standard, which sets a standard
for each individual victim. I will consider these three negligence standards and the other
fundamental type of liability standard, strict liability. Under strict liability an injurer is
liable for all harm she causes irrespective of her behavior.
I find that only one liability regime implements the social optimum in general – the
marginal definition of harm combined with the benefit-harm negligence standard. How-
ever, as already noted, the benefit-harm negligence standard is unlikely to be employed
in a real-world scenario. All other liability regimes are biased. The direction of these
biases is often ambiguous in general, since there are often multiple biases at play, which
potentially pull into opposing directions.
Liability regimes employing the absolute definition of harm cannot implement the
social optimum in general, since it only reflects increases in the victims’ damage levels
above the respective victim’s damage level without any SRM at all. In contrast, the
marginal definition of harm reflects all increases in the respective victim’s damage levels
due to increases in SRM provision. The former definition is therefore biased towards too
high SRM provision levels, while the latter is unbiased. This result is of importance for
SRM compensation regimes more generally, in that any compensation regime must define
a reference point which is used to determine the amount of compensation to award. The
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characteristics and incentive effects of the absolute and the marginal definition then
carry over to their respective counterparts in any mechanism under which the SRM
provider has to compensate victims.
Liability regimes employing the benefit-harm negligence standard can implement the
social optimum in general. This standard is unbiased since it considers all agents’ welfare.
All other liability standards do not internalize the positive externality. Strict liability and
the aggregate harm negligence standard both fully internalize the negative externality.
They therefore implement the same SRM provision level in equilibrium and are biased to
too low SRM levels. The individual harm negligence standard does not fully internalize
the negative externality, since each victim’s harm is balanced individually against the
injurer’s benefits. Its bias is therefore ambiguous in general. No liability implements the
free-driver outcome.
I numerically implement the SRM liability model into the Residual Climate Response
(RCR) model (Moreno-Cruz et al. 2012) which has been developed and used (Moreno-
Cruz et al. 2012, Kravitz et al. 2014, Yu et al. 2015) to examine regional SRM
effects. I do so for two reasons. Firstly, in order to obtain an estimate of how severe the
SRM governance problem is, I want to quantify the in the theoretical literature well-
established (Weitzman 2015, Heyen 2016) free-driver-problem. Secondly, the numerical
implementation of the liability model might help illuminate how the performance of
the non-optimal liability regimes compared to the free-driver outcome and the social
optimum is, whether there are major differences in performance between these regimes
and whether the choice of the definition of harm and the choice of the liability standard
are equally important. The RCR model is a simple framework for evaluating regional
climate responses to SRM which uses quadratic regional damage functions in regional
mean temperature and precipitation, with damages being minimal and normalized to
zero at regional preindustrial conditions. For the implementation I use data from the
G1 experiment of the Geoengineering Intercomparision Project (Kravitz et al. 2011).
In line with the literature (Moreno-Cruz et al. 2012, Yu et al. 2015), I find that
socially optimal SRM is very effective at reducing residual damages for the temperature
metric (0.2% of unmitigated climate change damages) and effective for the precipitation
metric (5.1%). Concurrent research comes to the conclusion that the SRM governance
problem might be substantial: Using an integrated assessment model approach for quan-
tifying the free-driver outcome, Emmerling and Tavoni (2017) find SRM overprovision
of a factor of eight. Using the much simpler RCR model approach, I find that the
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the extent of the free-driver problem depends on the metric chosen: For a metric of
mean temperature there is only moderate SRM overprovison in the free-driver outcome
in which SRM is still capable to reduce damages effectively (1.8%). However, there is
drastic overprovision for a metric of mean precipitation in the free-driver outcome, lead-
ing to damages 6.5 times higher than without any SRM. These findings confirm earlier
results that regional differences in SRM impacts are larger for precipitation than for
temperature (Moreno-Cruz et al. 2012, Kravitz et al. 2014, Yu et al. 2015). In the
free-driver outcome, the differences in residual damages between the two metrics are
amplified, since SRM provision is according to the strongest preferences for SRM.
In the presence of liability regimes, SRM is also for the precipitation metric imple-
mented in a welfare-enhancing way: All regimes reduce damages to at most 19.6% of
unmitigated climate change damages for this metric. Liability regimes employing the
marginal definition of harm virtually implement the social optimum for both metrics.
For the temperature metric, the absolute definition’s bias renders liability regimes with-
out any effect at all. Differences in outcomes across the definition of harm are larger
than differences in outcomes across liability standards and liability regimes employing
the marginal definition of harm do consistently better than regimes employing the ab-
solute definition. Therefore, given the assumptions of this numerical implementation,
the choice of the definition of harm is more consequential than the choice of the liability
standard for the performance of a liability regime.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the general SRM liability model.
Section 3 discusses the definitions of harm, while section 4 the liability standards. Section
5 examines the performance of the various liability regimes. In section 6 the SRM liability
model is implemented into the RCR model. Section 7 concludes.
2 The SRM Liability Model
I model SRM as a public good-or-bad which exhibits the free-driver characteristic. Be-
sides the usual public good features of non-excludability and non-rivalry, being a public
good-or-bad means that a marginal increase in the provision of the good-or-bad may be
beneficial or harmful for the same agent, depending on amounts already provided. The
free-driver characteristic implies that agents are heterogeneous in their preferences re-
garding the SRM provision level x and that SRM can be provided at negligible marginal
costs.
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These assumptions are reflected in the model set-up: I assume that there are n
different agents and that each agent i has a well-defined and positive damage function
di(x),
depending on the SRM provision level x. Each damage function is convex and continuous
in x. Furthermore, each damage function is increasing beyond some provision level. This
implies that each agent i has a unique optimal SRM level xi. In line with SRM’s good-
or-bad characteristic I assume that xi > 0 for at least some agents.
I assume the social welfare criterion to be the minimization of total damages
min
x∈[0,xn]
∑
i
di(x).
Due to the individual damage functions’ characteristics this problem has a unique so-
lution which is denoted by x∗. I assume that it is always the n-th agent who has the
greatest incentives to provide SRM at the margin and that agent n is the sole SRM
provider.3
There is a liability regime in place which makes the SRM provider pay for the harm
she causes to other agents according to some liability function L(x). The liability func-
tion determines the amount of compensation the SRM provider as to pay given her
behavior. The SRM provider knows the liability function and minimizes her own dam-
age function plus the liability function:
min
x∈[0,xn]
[dn(x) + L(x)] .
The liability function L(x) depends on two dimensions in this model, harm to other
parties and the liability standard. The liability standard determines whether the SRM
provider has to make liability payments to other parties. Harm determines the amount
of compensation a party receives, in case the SRM provider has to compensate the party
according to the prevailing liability standard.
3The domain in the minimization problem can be restricted because SRM levels beyond the free-driver
outcome xn are never optimal and no agent has an incentive to provide SRM beyond xn.
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2.1 Definition of Harm
There are two salient reference points for measuring SRM harm: The first one is the
potential victim’s condition without any SRM provision. I call this definition of harm
the absolute definition of harm. The second one is the victim’s optimal condition or
preferred provision level, in other words, the level from which on SRM is indeed a bad
for the agent in question. I call this definition of harm the marginal definition of harm.
According to the absolute definition of harm, an agent i is harmed by SRM if her
damage level is above her damage level in the complete absence of SRM. The reference
point here is the damage level at zero SRM provision, i.e. harm is
hAi (x) = max{0, di(x)− di(0)}.
According to the the marginal definition of harm, an agent i is harmed if her damage
level would be lower under some smaller SRM level than the actual one. The reference
point here is the damage level at her optimal provision point xi, i.e. harm is
hMi (x) = di(max{x, xi})− di(xi).
Since harm is always positive, the definition of harm only impacts on the internaliza-
tion of the negative externality. In theory, a definition of harm could also be employed to
internalize the positive externality of SRM provision, by allowing for negative harm for
some provision levels x. Such ’negative liability’ does not correspond to the institutional
reality (Dari-Mattiacci 2009) and is therefore not considered in this paper.
2.2 Liability Standards
There are two traditional types of liability standards, strict liability and negligence stan-
dards. Under strict liability, the SRM provider has to compensate for any harm inflicted
on any agent according to the prevalent definition of harm. Liability payments to be
made by the SRM provider are then
LSL(x) =
∑
i 6=n
hi(x).
Under negligence, the provider has to pay damages in accordance with the prevalent
definition of harm, if she fails to meet a certain behavioral standard. The SRM provider’s
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behavior is characterized by the provision level x. In the law-and-economics literature,
the behavioral standard is conceived as a level of (costly) precaution which reduces harm
to other agents. Its standard economic interpretation is that it provides a balancing of the
marginal harm and marginal costs of preventing harm (Posner 1972, Landes and Posner
1987). Translated into the context of SRM, the costs of refraining from increasing the
SRM level are the forgone benefits in form of reduced damages to the SRM provider
and, potentially, other agents. The costs of preventing harm are weighted against the
prevented harm from not increasing the SRM level. Since there is SRM overprovision
in absence of governance, the behavioral standard is conceptualized as a maximum level
of SRM provision in this model. Liability payments then depend on the SRM level x
chosen by the provider:
LN (x) =
0 if x ≤ xNLSL(x) if x > xN
Here, xN is the behavioral standard. If the SRM provider complies with the standard,
she is absolved from liability. If she does not comply she has to pay for all harm caused,
i.e. she faces liability payments equivalent to those under strict liability.
In traditional liability settings, in which a single injurer’s actions unambiguously
harm a single victim, there is only one way how the behavioral standard can trade off
the two parties’ interests. However, in the multi-agent context of the public good-or-bad
SRM, there are several potential options for defining the behavioral standard. I give
three different interpretations of the behavioral standard, one guided by the normative
criterion of welfare maximization and two reflecting potential institutional realities.
From a normative welfare perspective, the weighting underlying the behavioral stan-
dard should reflect the consequences of the SRM provision level on all agents’ welfare:
This includes the harm inflicted on other parties, as well as the benefits, in form of dam-
age reduction, conveyed to other parties as positive externality and the SRM provider’s
damage reduction. I call the behavioral standard emerging from this interpretation the
benefit-harm negligence standard: This behavioral standard xBHN is the unique solu-
tion4 to
min
x∈[0,xn]
[
LSL(x) +
∑
i 6=n
di(min{xi, x}) + dn(x)
]
.
4There exists a unique solution since this is a continuous and convex optimization problem on a
compact set.
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Under benefit-harm negligence, the SRM provider has then to compensate either all
victims or none, depending on whether she complied with the benefit-harm negligence
standard or not.
While appealing from a normative point of view, the benefit-harm negligence stan-
dard, however, is likely to be incompatible with institutional reality. Consideration of
effects on parties that are not part of the trial is generally not permissible in interna-
tional law. This is likely to prevent third-party beneficiaries from being considered in
the behavioral standard and makes the benefit-harm negligence standard unlikely to be
employed in a real-world scenario.
Interpretations of negligence focusing on the parties harmed and the SRM provider
are arguably more in line with institutional reality. Two different potential settings
arise: In the first one the parties harmed sue jointly and are part of the same trial.
In the second one they sue individually and there are separate trials for each party
harmed. The former scenario suggests an interpretation of negligence under which the
victims’ harm is considered on aggregate in the weighting process. I call this standard
the aggregate harm negligence standard. The behavioral standard xAHN is defined as
the unique solution to
min
x∈[0,xn]
[
LSL(x) + dn(x)
]
.
Under aggregate harm negligence the SRM provider has then to compensate either all
victims or none, depending on whether she complied with the aggregate harm negligence
standard or not.
In the latter scenario, there are as many potential trials as potential victims. In each
case the court balances the victim’s harm individually with the SRM provider’s damage
reduction from increasing SRM provision. I call this the individual harm negligence
standard under which there is a standard xILN (i) for each potential victim i, where
each standard the solution to the respective minimization problem
min
x∈[0,xn]
[
hi(x) + dn(x)
]
.
Under individual harm negligence, the SRM provider has then to compensate victims on
an individual basis, depending on whether she complied with the standard corresponding
to the respective victim or not.
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3 Assessment of the Definitions of Harm
For a liability regime to induce the socially optimal SRM provision level, it must make
the SRM provider internalize the negative and the positive externalities on the other n−1
agents. Harm determines how large the compensation is which the SRM provider has
to pay to victims, given that she has to compensate according to the liability standard.
Since this compensation is always positive, the definition of harm only impacts on the
internalization of the negative externality. I will now examine the marginal and absolute
definition of harm with regard to their ability to be part of a SRM liability regime which
internalizes the negative externality.
Fully internalizing the negative externality means that any welfare-reducing effect
of further provision is reflected in the SRM provider’s optimization problem. Under all
liability regimes, the occurrence of harm is a necessary condition to award compensation.
Any negative change in welfare to third parties can only be internalized by a liability
regime to the extent that the negative change is reflected in what is understood to be
harm, i.e. to the extent that there is a corresponding positive change in the prevalent
definition of harm. In case of the absolute definition of harm
hAi (x) = max{0, di(x)− di(0)},
there are settings in which a negative change in third parties’ welfare does not correspond
to an increase in harm: Assume that xi > 0 for some agent i and that the current
provision level is xi. Consider a marginal increase in the provision level. Agent i will
clearly be worse-off by this marginal increase, since xi is her optimal provision point.
However, given the absolute definition of harm, harm is only positive if agent i’s damages
are larger compared to the her damages without any SRM at all. Since her damages,
given the provision level xi, are even smaller than those in the complete absence of SRM,
a marginal increase in the provision level cannot render her damages larger than those
in complete absence of SRM. This effect disappears as soon as the actual damage di(x)
is larger than the initial damage level di(0) in absence of SRM, in particular it is non-
existent if the agent’s optimal provision level xi is zero. I denote the largest provision
level such that absolute harm is zero for agent i by xAi . Furthermore, given a specific
provision level x, I define the victim set at a provision level x as the set of agents for
whom a marginal increase in the provision level is detrimental: V (x) = {i | xi < x}.
I have just argued that for all agents with xi > 0, there is a provision interval [xi, x
A
i ]
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Figure 1: Reference points for the marginal definition of harm (MDH) and the absolute def-
inition of harm (ADH). Victim V ’s damage function is in blue (solid curve), the injurer I’s
damage function is in red (dashed curve). The marginal definition of harm is represented by
the combination of the dotted and the solid vertical lines. The absolute definition of harm is
represented by the solid vertical line. At the provision level x˜ the marginal definition of harm is
positive, while the absolute definition of harm is zero.
in which the agent i’s marginal damage from SRM provision is positive, while marginal
harm5, given the absolute definition of harm, is zero. Therefore, the negative impacts
on agent i from further provision in that interval can never be reflected in the SRM
provider’s private maximization problem by means of any liability regime employing the
absolute definition of harm: Employing the absolute definition of harm introduces a bias
towards too high SRM provision levels x in equilibrium.
In contrast, in case of the marginal definition of harm
hMi (x) = di(max{x, xi})− di(xi),
5The harm’s derivative does not exist at all points. However, since the harm function is convex, the
one-sided derivatives exist, in particular the right derivative. Throughout the paper I am interested in
the changes of an increase in SRM, i.e. the right derivative. In cases in which the derivative does not
exist, be it for the harm function or any other function, I mean ”right derivative” when referring to the
derivative or marginals.
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marginal harm and marginal damage coincide for all agents in the victim set V (x):
d
dx
hMi (x) =
d
dx
di(x) if x ≥ xi
Any negative change (and only negative changes) in third-party welfare is reflected in the
marginal definition of harm. Therefore, employing the marginal definition of harm does
not introduce a bias towards too high SRM provision levels x in equilibrium. Whether
the negative changes in welfare on third parties is actually internalized by a specific
liability regime employing the marginal definition of harm is then up to the specific
liability rule employed.
Proposition 1.
1. The absolute definition of harm does in general not fully reflect the negative exter-
nality from increases in the SRM provision x. For
min{xi | xi > 0} ≤ x < max{xAi | i 6= n},
the sum of marginal damages for agents in the victim set V (x) is larger than the
sum of marginal harm:
∑
i∈V (x)
d
dx
di(x) >
∑
i∈V (x)
d
dx
hAi (x).
2. The marginal definition of harm fully reflects the negative externality from in-
creases in the SRM provision x. For all x, the sum of marginal damages for
agents in the victim set V (x) and the sum of marginal harm coincide:
∑
i∈V (x)
d
dx
di(x) =
∑
i∈V (x)
d
dx
hMi (x).
3. No liability regime employing the absolute definition of harm can in general imple-
ment the socially optimal SRM provision level. If there are two liability regimes
employing the same liability standard, one using the marginal definition and the
other one using the absolute definition of harm, the former implements a (weakly)
higher SRM provision level than the latter.
The assumption that xi > 0 for more than one agent is crucial for this result. In
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substance, there is not any difference between the marginal and the absolute definition
of harm, if this assumption is not fulfilled: If for all agents (except for the SRM provider)
xi = 0, we have a traditional setting of harm in which the first unit of an activity directly
harms all potential victims. In such a setting, the distinction between the marginal and
the absolute definition of harm becomes meaningless. The marginal definition of harm
essentially reestablishes such a traditional setting of harm: By setting the reference point
to the agent’s optimal provision level, it ignores all changes in an agent’s welfare before
the public good-or-bad unambiguously becomes a bad for the agent in question. This
allows the marginal definition of harm to reflect all negative changes in the victim’s
welfare.6
The absolute definition of harm’s bias does not imply that a specific liability standard
in combination with the absolute definition of harm does always worse than the same
standard in combination with the marginal definition of harm, since there is also a
positive externality at play. If the positive externality is as well not (fully) internalized
given the regime’s liability standard, which would give rise to a bias in the opposite
direction, the two biases (partially) cancel out. Which of the two liability regime then
entails the larger bias is ambiguous and depends on the specific case at hand.
Proposition 1 is of importance for SRM compensation regimes more generally. Any
compensation regime (e.g. insurance provided by the SRM provider) has to define a
reference point used to ascertain the amount of compensation to be paid. The counter-
parts of the marginal and the absolute definition in such a compensation regime then
have the same characteristics as those stated in proposition 1.
4 Assessment of the Liability Standards
In this section I discuss the liability standards, employing generic harm functions hi(x)
which can stand for both definitions of harm. I denote the equilibrium SRM provision
level under a liability standard S by xˆS . The equilibrium provision level also depends
on the definition of harm. However, all statements made in this section, in particular
statements about the equilibrium provision levels, hold for both definitions of harm.
Liability standards can only make the SRM provider internalize the negative externality
to the extent that it is reflected in the definition of harm hi(x). They can therefore only
6The distinction between the marginal and the absolute definition of harm is related to a legal and
philosophical discussion on the nature of harm (Feinberg 1986, Perry 2003), which differentiates between
a ’worsening’ notion and a ’counterfactual’ notion of harm.
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internalize harm, but not the negative externality as such.
4.1 No Liability
In case of no liability, the SRM provider does neither face direct costs nor liability
payments. Acting in self-interest, she provides SRM up to her personal optimum. SRM
provision in equilibrium is then the free-driver outcome xˆFD = maxi xi > x
∗.
4.2 Strict Liability
Under strict liability, liability payments are the sum of the individual agents’ harm:
LSL(x) =
∑
i 6=n
hi(x).
The SRM provider minimize the sum of her liability payments and her own damage:
min
x∈[0,xn]
[LSL(x) + dn(x)].
At any provision level, the provider faces the trade-off between a marginal decrease
in her own damages and a marginal increase in her liability payments. The liability
payments reflect the increases in third-party harm and the SRM provider therefore
internalizes the full harm externality. However, positive externalities are not captured
in her minimization problem. Since the negative externality is fully captured, but the
positive externality is not captured, strict liability carries a bias towards too low SRM
provision levels. A liability regime employing strict liability can therefore in general not
implement the socially optimal outcome x∗.
4.3 Negligence Rules
Negligence rules set a behavioral standard to which the provider must adhere in order
to escape liability payments. The behavioral standard is some maximum SRM provision
level xN . The SRM provider faces damages of
LN (x) =
0 if x ≤ xNLSL(x) if x > xN
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and her minimization problem accordingly is
min
x∈[0,xn]
dn(x) +
0 if x ≤ xNLSL(x) if x > xN

If the SRM provider is better-off by complying with the standard compared to her
optimal choice under strict liability, she will choose the provision level xN in equilibrium.
Benefit-Harm Negligence
The benefit-harm negligence standard is guided by the normative approach of balancing
costs and benefits of all agents. The behavioral standard xBHN is defined as solution to
min
x∈[0,xn]
LSL(x) +∑
i 6=n
di(min{xi, x}) + dn(x)
 .
This minimization problem includes the same components as the SRM provider’s min-
imization problem under strict liability plus the terms representing the positive exter-
nality. It therefore holds that the behavioral standard under benefit-harm negligence is
larger than the equilibrium outcome under strict liability : xBHN ≥ xˆSL. Complying with
the benefit-harm negligence standard, the SRM provider does not face liability payments
and her damage level is dn(xBHN ). Under strict liability she faces liability payments
and her damage level is dn(xˆSL). Since xn ≥ xBHN ≥ xˆSL, she is better-off by comply-
ing with the benefit-harm negligence standard. It follows that x∗BHN = xBHN ≥ x∗SL.
Since the benefit-harm negligence standard takes into account both the positive and the
negative externality, it is not biased and a liability regime employing this standard may
implement the social optimal outcome x∗ in general.
Aggregate Harm Negligence
The aggregate harm negligence standard reflects a setting in which all agents harmed
jointly sue the SRM provider. In this setting all agents harmed are party to the trial
and their harm is taken into consideration on aggregate. The resulting aggregate harm
negligence standard xALN is defined as solution to
min
x∈[0,xn]
[LSL(x) + dn(x)] .
15
Since this is identical to the private minimization problem the SRM provider faces under
strict liability, we have xALN = x
∗
SL. It directly follows that the SRM provider chooses
x∗ALN = xALN = x
∗
SL in equilibrium in order to avoid paying damages. The aggregate
harm negligence standard leads to the same outcome as strict liability : It carries a bias
towards too low SRM provision levels and fully internalizes the negative externality
while not capturing the positive externality at all. However, note that the aggregate
harm negligence standard has other distributional effects: While the agents harmed
receive compensation under strict liability, there are no liability payments under the
aggregate harm negligence standard in equilibrium.
Individual Harm Negligence
The individual harm negligence standard reflects a setting in which agents harmed in-
dividually sue the SRM provider. In this setting there is an individual for each victim
and their harm is taken into consideration individually. Therefore, there is an individual
behavioral standard xIHN (i) for each agent i (except for the SRM provider) under the
individual harm negligence standard. The individual standard for agent i is defined as
solution to:
min
x∈[0,xn]
[hi(x) + dn(x)] .
For a given provision level x the liability payments are
LIHN (x) =
∑
i 6=n
lIHN (i, x) with
lIHN (i, x) =
0 if x ≤ xIHN (i)hi(x) if x > xIHN (i) .
The SRM provider’s minimization problem then is
min
x∈[0,xn]
dn(x) +∑
i 6=n
0 if x ≤ xIHN (i)hi(x) if x > xIHN (i)
 .
Since there is an individual behavioral standard for each potential victim, the SRM
provider will in general adhere to some of these behavioral standards and not to others.
Since these behavioral standards only consider one victim’s harm at a time, they fail to
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internalize the harm of all other victims in their balancing process: Consider the smallest
of the individual standards. At this standard’s provision level, the marginal benefit to
the SRM provider and the marginal harm to the victim in question are balanced, but
the marginal harm to all other victims is neglected. Taking this harm to the other
victims into account shows that the aggregate marginal harm at this provision level
outweighs the SRM provider’s marginal benefit. Therefore, the victims’ harm is only
partially internalized under the individual harm negligence standard. This implies that
the individual harm negligence equilibrium provision level is larger than under strict
liability and the aggregate harm negligence standard: xˆIHN ≥ xˆAHN = xˆSL. However,
not only the victims’ harm is not fully internalized, but also the positive externality is not
internalized at all under the individual harm negligence standard: The individual harm
negligence standard is biased, but the direction of the bias is ambiguous in general. It is
therefore also ambiguous whether the individual harm negligence equilibrium provision
level is larger or smaller than the benefit-harm negligence equilibrium provision level. The
answer to this depends both on the definition of harm and the agents’ damage functions.
Due to the standard’s bias, a liability regime employing the individual harm negligence
standard is in general not able to implement the socially optimal SRM provision level.
The results about liability standards are summarized in
Proposition 2.
1. No liability regime employing one of the liability standards of strict liability, the
aggregate harm negligence standard or the individual harm negligence standard can
in general implement the socially optimal SRM provision level.
2. For both definitions of harm, it holds that
xˆFD ≥ xˆBHN ≥ xˆSL = xˆAHN and xˆFD ≥ xˆIHN ≥ xˆSL = xˆAHN .
The ordering of xˆBHN and xˆIHN is ambiguous in general and depends on the
agents’ damage functions di(x) and the prevalent definition of harm.
The benefit-harm negligence standard is the only liability standard which can be
part of a liability regime which implements the socially optimal SRM provision level
in general. However, as already mentioned, the benefit-harm negligence standard is
unlikely to be employed in a real-world scenario, since consideration of effects on parties
that are not part of the trial is generally not permissible in international law, which
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is probably the most important body of law for SRM. Furthermore, the benefit-harm
negligence standard imposes the highest informational requirements on a court, since for
the determination of the standard the welfare of all regions would have to be considered.
5 Assessment of Liability Regimes
I now assess the performance of liability regimes, each consisting of a definition of harm
and a liability standard. I denote the equilibrium SRM provision level under a liability
regime consisting of liability standard S and definition of harm H by xˆS(H). The
behavioral standard corresponding to a negligence rule S in combination with a definition
of harm H is accordingly denoted by xS(H).
The marginal definition of harm and the benefit-harm negligence standard both do
not carry a bias. A liability regime employing those two components indeed succeeds in
implementing the socially optimal SRM level: The social optimum x∗ is defined as the
solution to
min
x∈[0,xn]
∑
i
di(x).
Given the marginal definition of harm
hMi (x) = di(max{x, xi})− di(xi),
the behavioral standard under the benefit-harm negligence standard is defined as the
solution to
min
x∈[0,xn]
∑
i 6=n
(di(max{x, xi} − di(xi))) +
∑
i 6=n
di(min{xi, x}) + dn(x)
 .
Since di(max{x, xi}) + di(min{x, xi}) = di(x) + di(xi), this is equivalent to
min
x∈[0,xn]
∑
i 6=n
di(xi) + dn(x)
 ,
and therefore equivalent to the minimization problem which defines the social opti-
mum. From the discussion of the benefit-harm negligence standard we know that the
SRM provider adheres to that standard in equilibrium. It follows that xˆBHN (M) =
xBHN (M) = x
∗.
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Knowing the biases, or absence of biases, of the different definitions of harm and
of the different liability standards, one can infer the performance of the other potential
liability regimes relative to the social optimum.
Proposition 3.
1. A liability regime employing the marginal definition of harm and the benefit-harm
negligence standard implements the socially optimal SRM provision level in equi-
librium.
2. In combination with the marginal definition of harm, strict liability and the ag-
gregate harm negligence standard implement too low SRM provision levels in equi-
librium compared to the social optimum, whereas the marginal definition of harm
combined with the individual harm negligence standard may lead to too high or too
low provision levels in equilibrium compared to the social optimum.
3. In combination with the absolute definition of harm, the benefit-harm negligence
standard implements too high SRM provision levels in equilibrium compared to the
social optimum, whereas strict liability, the aggregate harm negligence standard and
the individual harm negligence standard in combination with the absolute defini-
tion of harm implement too high or too low SRM provision levels in equilibrium
compared to the social optimum.
Summary of Model Results
Bias: Liability Standards MDH ADH
Bias: Definitions of Harm o +
BHN Standard o o +
SL & AHN Standard - - ?
IHN Standard ? ? ?
Table 1: The second row and the second column report the biases for the definitions of harm
and the liability standards, respectively, alone. The net bias for the liability regimes, each
consisting of a definition of harm and a liability standard, are reported in the third and fourth
column. An ’o’ marks the absence of a bias, a ’+’ one towards too high SRM provision levels,
a ’–’ one towards too low ones and a ’?’ marks a bias whose direction is ambiguous in general.
Abbreviations: Marginal definition of harm (MDH); Absolute definition of harm (ADH); Benefit-
harm negligence (BHN); Aggregate harm negligence (AHN); Individual harm negligence (IHN);
Strict Liability (SL).
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6 Numerical Implementation
I numerically implement the SRM liability model for two main reasons: Firstly, various
studies have numerically examined the regional effects of SRM (Moreno-Cruz et al. 2012,
Kravitz et al. 2014, Yu et al. 2015), using regional mean temperature and regional
mean precipitation as metrics. These studies have so far focused on Pareto-optimal
and socially optimal SRM provision levels, finding that the socially optimal provision
of SRM reduces damages at the regional level compared to climate changes damages
substantially (Moreno-Cruz et al. 2012, Yu et al. 2015) and that Pareto-optimal SRM
reduces regional damages considerably at least for the temperature metric (Kravitz et
al. 2014). However, these studies ignored the underlying incentive structure. The free-
driver’s incentive to provide SRM up to her private optimum is well-established in the
literature (Weitzman 2015, Heyen 2016). I quantify the free-driver problem in order to
estimate the extent of the SRM governance problem.
Secondly, in the theoretical part of this paper I found that only one liability regime
implements the social optimum. However, this regime employs the liability standard
arguably least likely to be employed in the real world. All other liability regimes fail to
implement the social optimum. Whether these liability regimes implement too much or
too little SRM compared to the social optimum is often ambiguous, due to the presence
of multiple biases, which potentially pull into opposing directions. The numerical im-
plementation of the liability model might help illuminate how the performance of these
non-optimal, but more likely to be employed, liability regimes compares to the free-driver
outcome and the social optimum is, whether there are major differences in performance
between these regimes and whether the choice of the definition of harm and the choice
of the liability standard are equally important.
Moreno-Cruz et al. (2012) have developed a simple framework for evaluating regional
effects of SRM, the Residual Climate Response (RCR) model. The RCR model uses
quadratic regional damage functions in regional mean temperature and precipitation,
with damages being minimal and normalized to zero at regional preindustrial conditions.
These quadratic damage functions are one specific instance of the more general regional
damage functions used in the theoretical part of this paper. Using preindustrial climate
conditions as a baseline to evaluate regional SRM impacts, and thereby assuming that
any deviation from that baseline inflicts damage, has been criticized as unrealistic in the
literature (Heyen et al. 2015). However, since there is no obvious way which baseline
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to employ instead, I follow the existing studies (Moreno-Cruz et al. 2012, Kravitz et al.
2014, Yu et al. 2015) and hold on to using the preindustrial baseline.
6.1 The Residual Climate Response Model
The RCR model uses 22 geographic regions (as defined in Giorgi and Francisco 2000).
The relevant climate metric is either regional mean temperature or regional mean precip-
itation. Let M be either of these metrics. A region’s climate preferences are determined
by a regional damage function. Regional damage is quadratic in the regional deviation
∆Mi(x) from the preindustrial mean:
di(x) = −∆Mi(x)2.
These preferences imply that regional damage is lowest (i.e. zero) for preindustrial
regional means.
The regional deviation from the preindustrial mean is the sum of the individual
regional deviations due to climate change (∆MiCO2) and SRM (∆MiSRM (x)). Both of
these deviations are normalized by preindustrial regional interannual variability σiM,pre.
The SRM provision level’s impact is assumed to be linear7:
∆Mi(x) = ∆MiCO2 + ∆MiSRM (x) = ∆MiCO2 + x ·∆MiSRM .
∆MiCO2 is the normalized difference between the pure climate change regional mean
M iCO2 and the preindustrial regional mean M
i
pre:
∆MiCO2 =
M iCO2 −M ipre
σiM,pre
.
∆MiSRM is the normalized difference between the regional mean M iSRM in the SRM
climate, in which global mean temperature is restored to the preindustrial level, and the
pure climate change regional mean M iCO2:
∆MiSRM =
M iSRM −M iCO2
σiM,pre
.
7Moreno-Cruz et al. (2012) and Kravitz et al. (2014) provide evidence for the reasonableness of this
linear climate response assumption.
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For all regions, M ipre, M
i
CO2, M
i
SRM and σ
i
M,pre have to be calculated from climate model
data. ∆MCO2 is called the CO2 vector and x ·∆MSRM is called the SRM vector. For a
given SRM provision level x, the residual vector ∆M(x) contains all regions’ normalized
deviations from the preindustrial mean.
V
i

t
i
m
Injurer
∆T I(0)
∆TV(0)
∆T I(x∗)
∆TV(x∗)
∆T I(xV )
∆TV(xI)
∆
T S
R
M
(x
I
)
∆TC
O
2
∆
T
(x ∗
)
Figure 2: Residual Climate Response model. The horizontal axis shows changes in temperature
for the injurer I, the vertical axis shows changes in temperature for the victim V . The blue CO2
vector represents the temperature change due to climate change. The green SRM vector repre-
sents the temperature change due to SRM implemented according to the injurer’s preferences.
The red vector is the residual vector in the social optimum, pointing to regional temperatures
under the socially optimal amount of SRM. Since regional damages are quadratic, the squared
length of the residual vector represents the residual damages in the social optimum. In absence of
governance, the injurer has incentives to provide SRM up to her preferred provision level xI , the
free-driver outcome, implying a larger residual vector than in the social optimum. The victim’s
preferred provision level xV is attained at the intersection of the SRM vector with the horizontal
axis.
The measure of global welfare is residual damages D(x), i.e. the sum of regional
residual damages di(x), normalized to units of unmitigated climate change damages:
D(x) =
∑
i di(x)∑
i di(0)
The theoretical minimum of residual damages is zero (for preindustrial climate condi-
tions), while residual damages for pure climate change conditions (zero SRM) are one.
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Moreno-Cruz et al. (2012) use three different ways of weighting a region’s damages. In
this paper all regions’ damages are accorded the same weight.
I use data from the G1 experiment as defined in the Geoengineering Model Intercom-
parision Project (Kravitz et al. 2011). The G1 experiment consists of a preindustrial
model run, a pure climate change model run with elevated CO2 levels and a model run in
which SRM is deployed on top of the elevated CO2 climate in order to restore the prein-
dustrial global mean temperature. This implies that a SRM provision level of x = 1 in
the model corresponds to restoring preindustrial global mean temperature. M ipre, M
i
CO2,
M iSRM and σ
i
M,pre can be calculated from the runs of the G1 experiment. I did so for
each of the thirteen climate models participating in G1 individually and averaged the
results. I then carried out the numerical implementation based on the averaged M ipre,
M iCO2, M
i
SRM and σ
i
M,pre. I used the average across climate models, since the free-driver
scenario reflects the strongest preferences for SRM and is therefore prone to outliers.
6.2 Results from the RCR Model
I report the equilibrium SRM level and the associated residual damages for the social
optimum, for the free-driver outcome under no liability and for each liability regime.
For comparison I also report the results for the Pareto optimum. I find an optimal SRM
level of 0.99 for the temperature metric and of 0.80 for the precipitation metric. These
optimal SRM levels entail residual damages of 0.2% and 5.1% of unmitigated climate
change damages. Pareto-optimal SRM levels are 0.93 for the temperature metric and
zero for the precipitation metric. These results are in line with the findings of Moreno-
Cruz et al. (2012), Kravitz et al. (2014) and Yu et al. (2015).8
Concurrent research comes to the conclusion that the SRM governance problem
might be substantial: Using an integrated assessment model approach for quantifying
the free-driver outcome, Emmerling and Tavoni (2017) find SRM overprovision of a
factor of eight. Using the simpler RCR model approach, I find that the the extent of the
8Moreno-Cruz et al. (2012) report residual damages of 1% for the temperature metric (independent
of the weighting) and a range of 3%− 15% for the precipitation metric. Kravitz et al. (2014) and Yu et
al. (2015) use data from the climate models participating in the G1 experiment. Yu et al. (2015) report
residual damages of 0% (independent of the climate model) for the temperature metric and an average
of 14% with a standard deviation of 14% for the precipitation metric in the social optimum. Note that in
this study the results for the individual models were calculated and then averaged, while in the present
paper the averaging is done for the parameters M ipre, M
i
CO2, M
i
SRM and σ
i
M,pre. For the median climate
model, Kravitz et al. (2014) report a Pareto-optimal SRM level of 0.91 for the temperature metric and
of zero for the precipitation metric.
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free-driver problem depends on the metric chosen: For the temperature metric, there
is moderate SRM overprovison in the free-driver outcome (13% higher compared to the
social optimum; total damage is 1.6 percentage points of unmitigated climate change
damages higher than in the social optimum) and SRM still reduces regional damages
very effectively. However, for the precipitation metric, overprovision in the free-driver
outcome is 362% compared to the social optimum and total damage is 658 percentage
points of unmitigated climate change damages. While the inefficiencies due to the free-
driver outcome are small for the temperature metric, these results suggest that the
free-driver problem for SRM is devastating if mean precipitation is the relevant metric.
These results reflect the findings from earlier studies that regional differences in SRM
effects are more pronounced for precipitation than for temperature (Moreno-Cruz et al.
2012, Kravitz et al. 2014, Yu et al. 2015). The findings for the free-driver outcome
confirm the direction of these results, but are more incisive: For the temperature metric
SRM is even in the free-driver outcome very effective at reducing unmitigated climate
change damages. However, SRM does not only become ineffective in the free-driver
outcome under the precipitation metric, but it produces damages more than a factor 6.5
higher compared to unmitigated climate change. The reason that the difference in results
for the two metrics in the free-driver outcome become so extreme is that the region with
the strongest preferences for SRM determines the level of SRM. In this scenario the
larger regional SRM disparities for precipitation have a much stronger effect on welfare,
compared to scenarios in which the socially optimal or the Pareto-optimal SRM level
are deployed.
Liability regimes employing the marginal definition of harm do very well for both
the temperature and the precipitation metric. They reduce damages compared to the
free-driver outcome very effectively, both in absolute and in relative terms: The only
standards for which the absolute difference between the residual damages under a liability
regime employing the marginal definition of harm and the damage level in the social
optimum is larger than 0.1% percentage points of unmitigated climate change damages
are strict liability and the aggregate harm negligence standard in combination with the
precipitation metric. The absolute difference in residual damages here is 0.7% percentage
points of unmitigated climate change damages. This difference corresponds to 13.7%
higher damages under the liability regime compared to the social optimum. At the same
time it corresponds to only 1h of the difference in residual damages between the free-
driver outcome and the social optimum, which implies that the liability regime achieves
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Panel A: Temperature Metric
Marginal Definition of Harm Absolute Definition of Harm
SRM Level Damages SRM Level Damages
Social Optimum 0.99 0.2 0.99 0.2
Pareto Optimum 0.93 0.5 0.93 0.5
Free-Driver Outcome 1.12 1.8 1.12 1.8
BHN Standard 0.99 0.2 1.12 1.8
SL & AHN Standard 0.96 0.3 1.12 1.8
IHN Standard 0.96 0.3 1.12 1.8
Panel B: Precipitation Metric
Marginal Definition of Harm Absolute Definition of Harm
SRM Level Damages SRM Level Damages
Social Optimum 0.81 5.1 0.81 5.1
Pareto Optimum 0.00 100 0.00 100
Free-Driver Outcome 2.93 658 2.93 658
BHN Standard 0.81 5.1 1.11 18.7
SL & AHN Standard 0.74 5.8 1.03 12.1
IHN Standard 0.80 5.1 1.12 19.6
Table 2: SRM levels are given as a fraction of the SRM level which restores global mean tem-
perature to preindustrial. Residual damages in percent of unmitigated climate change damages.
No SRM therefore corresponds to residual damages of 100%.
99.9% of the possible reduction in residual damages.
Liability regimes employing the absolute definition of harm do less well. For the tem-
perature metric, liability regimes employing the absolute definition of harm are without
any effect at all. This shows that even in the free-driver outcome there is no harm to
other agents according to the absolute definition, given the temperature metric and the
climate preferences assumed in the RCR model. However, for the precipitation metric, li-
ability regimes employing the absolute definition of harm achieve a substantial reduction
in damages: The absolute differences in residual damages between social optimum and
liability regime range from 7.0% (SL and AHN), through 13.6% (BHN) to 14.5% (IHN).
This corresponds to 137%, 167% and 184% higher damages under the respective liability
regime compared to the social optimum and to 1.9%, 2.1% and 2.2% of the difference in
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residual damages between the free-driver outcome and the social optimum. While the
differences in damages to the social optimum are not trivial, all of these liability regimes
achieve at least 97.8% of the possible reduction in residual damages.
The differences in outcomes across liability standards are comparatively small. For
the temperature metric, the liability standards are irrelevant given the absolute defini-
tion of harm, since harm is then zero even in the free-driver outcome. In combination
with the marginal definition of harm, the different liability standards still lead to almost
the same outcomes. For the precipitation metric, residual damages under the benefit-
harm negligence and the individual harm negligence standard are very similar: For the
marginal definition of harm, the benefit-harm negligence standard implements the social
optimum (residual damages of 5.1%) and the SRM equilibrium provision level under
the individual harm negligence standard is close enough to the social optimum that the
absolute difference in residual damages to the social optimum is smaller than 0.1%.
For the absolute definition of harm, residual damages under the benefit-harm negligence
standard are 18.7% and 19.6% for the individual harm negligence standard. The results
for the precipitation metric confirms that the ordering in terms of SRM equilibrium
provision level of the benefit-harm and the individual harm negligence standards is in
general ambiguous. Under strict liability and the aggregate harm negligence standard,
residual damages are somewhat higher for the marginal definition of harm (5.8%) com-
pared to the other two standards, but substantially smaller for the absolute definition of
harm (12.1%). The reason is that these two standards are biased towards too low SRM
provision levels. Since the marginal definition of harm has no bias, the standards’ bias
drives the SRM equilibrium provision level away from the social optimum. However,
the absolute definition of harm is biased towards too high SRM provision levels and the
biases at play then partially cancel out.
The results show that, at least under the assumptions of the RCR model, liability
regimes employing the marginal definition of harm do in every instance better than
regimes employing the absolute definition. Furthermore, the only instance in which the
performance between regimes employing different liability standards differs noticeably,
is for the precipitation metric in combination with the absolute definition of harm. How-
ever, even in this case, the differences in residual damages between liability regimes
employing different definitions of harm are larger than between liability regimes employ-
ing different liability standards. The results of the implementation therefore suggest that
the choice of the definition of harm is more consequential for a liability regime’s perfor-
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mance than the choice of the liability standard and that the marginal definition of harm
is generally superior to the absolute definition of harm. Liability regimes always lead to
a significant reduction in residual damages with the exception of those employing the
absolute definition of harm in case of the temperature metric. In particular, this means
that liability regimes always achieve a significant reduction in residual damages under
the precipitation metric, the case in which the free-driver outcome leads to devastating
damage levels.
7 Conclusion
SRM is a set of techniques which has received increasing attention as potential means
to offset climate change. Governance is a key issue for SRM, since it is likely to be
cheap and would have regionally different impacts, giving rise to the ”free-driver” prob-
lem (Weitzman 2015): In the absence of governance, the country with the strongest
preferences for SRM has incentives to deploy SRM beyond the preferred provision point
of all other countries. This paper focuses on liability regimes as a potential governance
instrument. In the paper I developed a framework to understand the basic incentives
SRM liability regimes provide. Furthermore, I implemented the model numerically in
order to obtain a first-order estimate of the extent of the SRM governance problem and
the capability of liability regimes to solve it in a simplified setting.
SRM is a public good-or-bad, a public good which benefits agents at some levels and
harms the same agents at other levels. This feature sets SRM apart from more traditional
domains of liability. The public good-or-bad characteristic is in two ways relevant for the
incentives a liability regime provides. The first one concerns the definition of harm, which
is about which SRM impacts have to be compensated for. The second one concerns the
liability standards, which are about the circumstances under which harm from SRM has
to be compensated for. The liability model of SRM in this paper puts the definition of
harm and the liability standards center stage in order to focus on the specific incentives
arising for a SRM provider from SRM’s good-or-bad characteristic under a liability
regime. A liability regime in the model consequently consists of a definition of harm and
a liability standard.
I give two definitions of harm. As liability standards I consider strict liability and
three interpretations of the negligence standard. Only one definition of harm, the
marginal definition, and only one liability standard, the benefit-harm negligence stan-
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dard, are unbiased. Therefore, only the liability regime employing the marginal defini-
tion of harm and the benefit-harm negligence standard implements the social optimum.
However, the benefit-harm negligence standard is the one least likely to be employed in
a real-world scenario due to the legal institutional reality. All other liability regimes do
in general not implement the social optimum and carry a bias towards too low or high
SRM provision levels. The direction of this bias is often ambiguous, since a regime’s net
bias is generally the result of multiple biases which may pull into opposing directions.
This highlights the difficulties in deciding which liability regime to pick in a real-world
scenario and shows that the choice of one component of a liability regime should in
general depend on the other component. Lastly, it should be noted that the results for
the definition of harm are of relevance for any SRM compensation mechanism.
I numerically implement the theoretical model into the Residual Climate Response
(RCR) model (Moreno-Cruz et al. 2012), a framework for investigating regional impacts
of SRM, using climate model data on regional mean temperature and precipitation from
the G1 experiment of the Geoengineering Model Intercomparision Project (Kravitz et al.
2011). It should be kept in mind that the RCR model is a simple framework and that the
results from using it serve as first-order estimation of the effects examined. Concurrent
research comes to the conclusion that the SRM governance problem might be substantial:
Using a more sophisticated integrated assessment model approach for quantifying the
free-driver outcome, Emmerling and Tavoni (2017) find SRM overprovision of a factor
of eight. Using the simpler RCR model approach, I find that the the extent of the
free-driver problem depends on the metric chosen: For the temperature metric, there is
moderate SRM overprovison in the free-driver outcome and SRM still reduces damages
in the free-driver outcome down to 1.8% of unmitigated climate change. It is extreme
for the mean precipitation metric and SRM increase damages by more than a factor of
6.5 in the free-driver outcome compared to unmitigated climate change. These findings
suggest that, from an economic point of view, the SRM governance problem is very
severe in case precipitation is the relevant metric, but rather benign in case temperature
is the relevant metric. This reflects earlier findings (Moreno-Cruz et al. 2012, Kravitz
et al. 2014, Yu et al. 2015) that regional SRM differences are more pronounced for
precipitation than for temperature. The difference between the two metrics is amplified
in the free-driver outcome, since the region with the most extreme preferences for SRM
then determines the SRM provision level.
Liability regimes lead to a welfare-enhancing implementation of SRM for the pre-
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cipitation metric: All regimes reduce damages to at most 19.6% of unmitigated climate
change damages for this metric. Liability regimes employing the marginal definition
of harm virtually implement the social optimum for both metrics. For the tempera-
ture metric, the absolute definition’s bias renders liability regimes without any effect
at all. Differences in outcomes across the definition of harm are larger than differences
in outcomes across liability standards and the marginal definition of harm always per-
forms better than the absolute definition. Given the assumptions of the RCR model,
all liability regimes drastically mitigate the extreme free-driver problem found for the
precipitation metric, the marginal definition of harm is generally superior to the abso-
lute definition and the choice of the definition of harm is of greater importance than the
liability standard for the performance of a SRM liability regime.
This paper has focused on the specific incentives liability regimes provide in light
of SRM’s good-or-bad characteristic. I therefore abstracted from various other SRM
aspects, which are important, but do not lie at the heart of the SRM-specific incentives
liability regimes provide. These aspects include uncertainty about SRM impacts, other
potential SRM side-effects like ozone loss or potential health impacts and potential
coalitions among agents (compare Ricke et al. 2013). Furthermore, I abstracted from
issues of causation. There are literatures dealing both with issues of causation in the
context of SRM (Horten et al. 2014 and Saxler et al. 2015) and with the general law-
and-economics implications of uncertain causation (Shavell 1985). Lastly, the model
presupposes an existing SRM liability regime. Currently, there is no dedicated SRM
liability regime in place and it is far from clear whether there will be such a regime
in the future. In any case, even in the absence of a dedicated SRM liability regime,
customary international law may provide a legal basis for SRM liability (Saxler et al.
2015).
There are valuable extensions future research could pursue. The first potential exten-
sion concerns the formation of coalitions. Agents who benefit greatly from SRM could
decide to form a coalition (Ricke et al. 2013) in order to provide SRM jointly, while shar-
ing the expected liability payments, thereby partly internalizing the positive externalities
from SRM provision. Taking coalitions into account has therefore the potential to alter
the assessment of the liability regimes presented in this paper. The second potential
extension is the consideration of treaty formation, asking the questions of whether and
under which conditions a liability regime could emerge as the result of a negotiation and
bargaining process. The framework presented in this paper and its insights regarding
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the incentives potential liability regimes provide are ideal starting points for approaching
these two extensions.
Lastly, future research could focus on extending the RCR model. At the moment,
agents in the RCR model have preferences for a preindustrial climate, an assumption
which does not seem to be very realistic (Burke et al. 2015, Heyen et al. 2015). An exten-
sion of the RCR model, which allows for climate preferences diverging from preindustrial
climate conditions, would be a valuable contribution for the assessment of regional SRM
impacts in general and as a result also for the assessment of the performance of SRM
liability regimes.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Only the second statement of the third part remains to be shown.
Liability standards are defined via the balancing of a subset of victims’ harm and a subset
of beneficiaries’ benefits (including the SRM provider). At any x and for any subset of
victims the respective sum of marginal harm is weakly smaller for the absolute definition
of harm than for the marginal definition of harm. Therefore, the SRM provider is for
a given liability standard at a given provision level x never liable given the absolute
definition of harm if she is not liable given the marginal definition of harm. If she is
not liable given the absolute definition of harm, her marginal costs of SRM provision are
zero under the absolute definition. If she is liable, she is also liable under the marginal
definition and marginal liability payments, her marginal costs of SRM provision, are
weakly higher given the marginal definition than given the absolute definition.
Proof of Proposition 2. Only the second statement of the second part remains to be
shown. Consider two settings in which the marginal definition of harm is the relevant
definition and in which there are four agents. Setting 1: d1(x) = 0.5x
2; d2(x) = 0.5(7.5−
x)2; d3(x) = 0.5(5 − x)2; d4(x) = 0.5(10 − x)2. Here, we have xˆBHN = 5.625 and
xˆIHN = 5. Setting 2: d1(x) = 0.5x
2; d2(x) = 0.5(2.5 − x)2; d3(x) = 0.5(5 − x)2;
d4(x) = 0.5(10− x)2. Here, we have xˆBHN = 4.325 and xˆIHN = 5.
Proof of Proposition 3. Only the statements about the SL, the AHN and IHN standards
in part three remain to be shown. Setting 1: d1(x) = 0.5(5− x)2; d2(x) = 0.5(10− x)2.
Absolute harm here is zero even for x = 10. All liability regimes employing the absolute
definition therefore implement a too high SRM provision level. Setting 2: d1(x) =
0.5x2; d2(x) = 0.5(8 − x)2; d3(x) = 0.5(10 − x)2. Here, all three liability standards in
combination with the absolute definition of harm implement a SRM provision level of 5,
which is below the socially optimal level x∗ = 6.
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